How do political timetables impact the relationship between the president and Congress

SUMMARY OF HEARINGS ON LEGISLATIVE-EXECUTIVE RELATIONS

The following witnesses testified before the Joint Committee to discuss the legislative-executive branch relationship: Former House Member and former Majority Whip John Brademas; Former Secretary of the Department of Veterans' Affairs and former House Member Edward Derwinski; Former Secretary of the Army and former House Member John O. Marsh, Jr.; Former Attorney General and former Governor Richard Thornburgh, and former Chairman of the Federal Reserve Paul Volcker.

Mr. Brademas began his testimony by stating that one cannot really discuss the issue of legislative-executive branch relations without understanding three fundamental factors of American government: (1) we have a separation of powers Constitution; (2) we have decentralized, undisciplined political parties; and (3) over the last 20 years there have been significant changes in Congress and its operation that in an already fragmented system have further dispersed power.

He stated that it is imperative to remember that Presidents, Senators, and Representatives are elected by different constituencies, for differing terms, and with different constitutional responsibilities. In our system the chief executive is not chosen from the legislative majority (unlike a parliamentary system) and often does not even belong to the majority party in Congress. The American way of governing was not designed for peaceful coexistence between the two branches, even when both are controlled by the same party.

Mr. Brademas said that another factor that greatly affects the relationship between the branches is the fact that ``we do not have highly disciplined political parties.''48 For various reasons, the ties of the party have been weakened over the last generation. Brademas added that perhaps the decline of political patronage and the rise of civil service is an explanation. Television has also served to weaken ties as it has now become the chief instrument of political communication.

``I was part of those changes aimed chiefly at curbing power of the autocratic chairmen, opening up the system to effective participation by more Members, and making the House more democratic and accountable,'' said Mr. Brademas.49 These reforms, however, have not made it easier to lead the House or forge majorities, he added. It is often as difficult for the Speaker as it is for the President.

``I believe that the issue of relations between Congress and the Executive in foreign affairs to be a far more profound challenge to the American Constitutional system than the American people are even now aware,'' stated the former House Whip.50 Because foreign policy is the life and death arena for the President and Congress; we imperil the security of our country unless there is a sense of trust between the two branches, he stated. So there must be an attitude if not always of harmony, of respect and, above all, trust, according to Mr. Brademas.

Mr. Brademas listed several reforms that should improve the capacity of the Congress to play its deliberative as well as representative role in our political system:

• A 4-year term for Members of the House. A longer term would enable them to focus on more long-range policy.

• Reform of the campaign finance laws. Mr. Brademas supports public financing of House and Senate races.

• Encouragement of contributions to political parties as a way of strengthening their place in developing policy proposals, fashioning consensus, and promoting greater citizen participation in politics.

In conclusion, Mr. Brademas emphasized total harmony between the branches is neither attainable or desirable. ``It must be obvious from what I have said that I do not favor eliminating friction and disagreement, not only an impossible goal, but an unwise one, because sometimes obstruction by Congress of the Executive Branch is in the national interest,'' stated Mr. Brademas.51

The Honorable Edward Derwinski, speaking from 24 years of experience as a former Member of the House and a former Cabinet Secretary, said that reform of the Congress must necessarily include a more effective relationship with the executive branch. Actions that Members of the legislative branch consider part of their duties, such as representing their constituents in disagreements with executive agencies, are viewed by members of the executive branch as intrusive, Mr. Derwinski testified.

Mr. Derwinski said that the legislative oversight process is the most effective tool that the Congress has to work with the executive. ``But it has been my judgment that that is the one [tool] that the Congress underutilizes or mishandles.''52 As the Secretary of the Department of Veterans' Affairs, Mr. Derwinski found that the oversight committees were interested only in chasing a scandal after the story had broken. ``The Congress was not interested in sitting down with us in advance, to work on procedure or work out legislation that might correct weaknesses in the system,'' he said.53

Mr. Derwinski identified ``parochial pressure'' as another source of tension between the two branches. The former secretary said there is a thin line between legitimate parochialism and overkill when it comes to management procedures.

Mr. Derwinski commended the Members of the House and Senate who had the foresight to impose the conditions contained in the military base closing legislation. ``I wish we had something like that at the VA so we could go over the institutions and the facilities that we have, streamline then improve them, improve the operations and then submit the plan to Congress on a take-it-or-leave-it basis the way you do with base closure,'' stated the former VA secretary.54

Mr. Derwinski also testified that Congress could play a much more effective role if legislative oversight and not dollars were the first concern of Members. There's a major gap between the legislative process -- the authorizing process, the appropriation process, and then much, much later, and usually too late, the legislative oversight, he said.

Finally, Mr. Derwinski advocated finding a way to devise and select a congressional panel to look at the long-term responsibilities and challenges facing government, not just the annual appropriations and the immediate crises. ``I have no precise solution for that, other than the feeling that something like that in the Congress would be an area where we could bring together our mutual interest in improving the efficiency of the executive branch, its use of funds, and at the same time permit us to do it without any abnormal interference from the logical parochial interests,'' he concluded.55

Former Secretary of the Army, former Counsel to President Ford, and former House Member John O. Marsh, Jr., began his testimony by stating that one of the great things lost in recent years is comity, the courtesy that exists between the branches. ``Anything this committee can do to restore that relationship, its courtesy between the branches, it is a lubricant I think that makes the wheels of government turn smoothly,'' said Mr. Marsh.56 ``The scope of what you are seeking to do -- the effectiveness in a total sense of the Federal system -- will hinge, in my view, upon an effective Congress,'' he said.

The demand across the country for term limitations is a reflection of public unrest that is demanding a revolutionary type of change, Mr. Marsh said. Despite the changes that have occurred in the United States and throughout the world, Congress has not made any effective changes since 1946. Mr. Marsh went on to say that he is convinced that the term limitation amendment will be adopted if this Committee does not come up with meaningful reform.

Mr. Marsh addressed the desire of Members to become more deeply involved in the structuring of policy. ``I would commend to this committee that you seek ways for the Congress to become more involved in the front-end,'' said Mr. Marsh.57 Congress needs to be more involved in the development and planning of national policy and less involved in the execution, he added. Mr. Marsh encouraged the Committee to define the role of Congress and find ways to become involved in policy and changing policy.

Mr. Marsh believes Congress is a major contributor to much of the gridlock we are experiencing in our government. Legislative gridlock occurs because of differences within and between the two houses: differences on issues between authorizations and appropriations and differences over jurisdictional interests. Gridlock also exists in the executive branch, and Congress should address this, Mr. Marsh testified. It can be a bureaucratic nightmare trying to establish consensus on legislative proposals sponsored by a department, he said. Getting proposed legislation to the Hill is one of the most formidable, difficult tasks that any Federal executive can have.

With the growth and complexity of the legislative program, the increase in population, and greater constituent duties, the expansion in numbers and power of congressional staffs was inevitable, said Mr. Marsh. However, accessibility to Members, not only by constituents, but by key people in the executive branch, is essential, he added. ``I would recommend that the committee establish an ad hoc committee on congressional staffing to look at the roles and functions of staff,'' said Mr. Marsh.58 Such a committee would establish certain guidelines and policies that relate to the conduct of staff members and their proper role and function.

Mr. Marsh suggested to the Committee that its tasks include two audits. The first audit would be to look at all committees and subcommittees, which the Committee has done. This inventory would also identify where there is overlap with other committees and duplication of hearings. The second audit would follow up on any legislation adopted within the last two decades which impact the executive branch, and would evaluate how the executive branch carried out its duties. After a group of statutes to be examined is agreed upon, the executive branch would have to report to Congress on the application and effectiveness of these statutes and could recommend any modification to the statute.

Mr. Marsh also advocated that Congress adopt a strategic plan for the nation for near-term, mid-term, and long-term (20-50 years.) The plan would cover national security and foreign affairs, social services, environment, and financial matters.

Former Attorney General Richard Thornburgh testified that one of the most vexatious matters in relationships between the executive and legislative branches is the request for documents, information, and access to witnesses in ongoing criminal investigations and highly sensitive matters. Mr. Thornburgh observed that the failure to create some effective vehicle for resolving disputes over release of such material only guarantees that future misunderstandings, to the ultimate detriment of the public good, will be inevitable. ``How many more interbranch conflicts will be necessary before we take steps to fashion a process that leads to reasoned, rational results?'' he asked.59

Moreover, the absence of a statute specifying what type of information the legislative branch is entitled to enables courts to dodge what they sometimes view as a political debate between two branches, Thornburgh said. The availability of a judicial forum, in which to obtain an immediate review of the competing interests of each branch of government might well contribute positively to a more deliberate, reasoned resolution of disputes, he said.

``I urge the Committee to seriously consider this proposal,'' said Thornburgh.60 ``As much as any other single factor you might review during the course of your deliberations, a recommendation from this body that a statute be adopted could pave the way for the establishment of constitutional parameters governing interbranch disputes over access to information and documents. More important, perhaps, it could go a long way toward reducing the prospect of this very damaging form of gridlock,'' concluded Thornburgh.61

Mr. Paul Volcker, Former Chairman of the Federal Reserve, said he sees a tendency on the part of Congress to overregulate, giving very detailed instructions to the executive about what to do. This has also been described as micromanaging. ``There is also a lack of consistent oversight, which is regrettable, because I don't think the bureaucracy should be exempt from what I think of as intelligent oversight,'' said Volcker.62

``It is quite frustrating for somebody dealing with Congress to have to sometimes face, as we did in highly repetitive testimony in the case of the Federal Reserve, perhaps a dozen different committees in the space of a week or two. What kind of remedies can arise? I can say from the other side of the table that committees tend to be too big, particularly in the House, to be really effective.''63 The smaller the committees, the more effective they tend to be, Volcker testified. He also believes there is too much jurisdictional overlap among committees.

The Congress has had extremely able staff over the years, Volcker said. Congress tends to attract more aggressive, young, bright people now than does the Executive. ``I am not sure that that is entirely in the interests of the most effective government,'' Volcker stated.64 However good they are, it becomes a question of too many becoming too much and this is what contributes to a lack of focus, he said.

Volcker also testified about recurrent problems in defining the borderline between privacy of investigations and of legitimate inquiries. Often the executive protects more than is necessary; and if there is going to be an effective relationship in an area where there is bound to be tension and conflict, there is a burden on the executive to be as open as it can be, Volcker said.

On July 1, 1993, Former Vice President Walter Mondale testified at the final hearing of the Joint Committee. Among the many subjects the former Vice President addressed was the relationship between the legislative and executive branches. He urged the Joint Committee to address the need for a more trusting relationship.

Mr. Mondale said one place to start is to move away from the highly prescriptive, deadline-laden bills Congress felt obliged to enact during the 1980s. ``We should prefer broad, general legislation, with systematic oversight of Presidential execution,'' he said.65 A movement back toward executive discretion should not be interpreted as a blank check for the President, he said, but an opportunity for Congress to set clear goals for executive performance.

Mr. Mondale testified that the change in statutory philosophy might also reduce the fragmented micromanagement that absorbs so much executive time. ``What Congress ought to be asking is whether the departments of government are delivering the right services in the most efficient manner,'' he said.66 Mr. Mondale believes the focus should be on setting clear expectations for executive performance, and holding appointees and their agencies accountable.

Mr. Mondale testified that separation of powers, the heart of the three branch system of government, historically has slowed down the government in order to make it better, not halt it in its tracks. The division of labor between the branches is an opportunity to share the burdens of governing, he said. Given the problems facing our nation, and given the public's yearning for real and substantive change, the Congress and the President have a responsibility to work together, Mr. Mondale said.

``When I served in the Senate, I was frustrated by what the White House was doing. Once I moved to the White House, I found myself often frustrated by what was happening on Capitol Hill.''67 This is as it should be, Mr. Mondale added. Yet, most of the time, each branch should stick to its own business, he added.

In summary, the witnesses expressed the feeling that while some friction is by nature necessary between the two branches, a change in approach might well be helpful and eventually lead to a more effective relationship between the two. The balance between the two branches is currently out of kilter. Witnesses cited two problems that contributed to the imbalance. The executive branch feels that it is micro-managed by the Congress, and the congressional position is that the executive branch deals with Congress in a less than straightforward manner. Both sides could take the necessary steps to restore the balance and trust in their relationship and at the same time increase their respective responsibilities.

FOOTNOTES

48 Joint Committee on the Organization of Congress. Interbranch Relations, Hearing. June 22, 1993. p. 212.
49 Ibid. June 22, 1993. p. 213.
50 Ibid. June 22, 1993. pp. 221-222.
51 Ibid. June 22, 1993. p. 224.
52 Ibid. June 22, 1993. p. 2.
53 Ibid. June 22, 1993. p.2.
54 Ibid. June 22, 1993. pp. 2-3.
55 Ibid. June 22, 1993. p. 3.
56 Ibid. June 22, 1993. p. 5.
57 Ibid. June 22, 1993. pp. 113-114.
58 Ibid. June 22, 1993. pp. 129-130.
59 Ibid. June 22, 1993. p. 158.
60 Ibid. June 22, 1993. p. 158.
61 Ibid. June 22, 1993. p. 158-159.
62 Ibid. June 22, 1993. p. 28.
63 Ibid. June 22, 1993. p. 29.
64 Ibid. June 22, 1993. p. 29.
65 Joint Committee. Testimony of Hon. Walter F. Mondale, Hearing. July 1, 1993. p. 9.
66 Ibid. July 1, 1993. p. 35.
67 Ibid. July 1, 1993. p. 35.

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