In which of the following ways can interest groups most effectively exercise influence over the federal courts?

An interest group is an organization whose members share common concerns, and try to influence government policies that impact those concerns.

An interest group is an organization whose members share common concerns, and try to influence government policies that impact those concerns.

Elected officials frequently complain about the influence of "special interests" on American politics. The fact is, however, that interest groups work closely with members of Congress and the administration to draft legislation and policy initiatives, provide information both to government and the public on a broad range of topical issues, and contribute significantly to political campaigns. The number of interest groups has grown dramatically in recent years, and it is difficult to think of a segment of American society that is not represented by one.

Interest groups can be classified as to the groups that they represent. Examples of economic interest groups include the following:

  • Big business (National Association of Manufacturers)
  • Big unions (AFL-CIO)
  • Trade associations concerned with a particular industry or segment of the economy (American Petroleum Institute)
  • Organizations of professionals (American Medical Association)

The goal of these groups is to protect the economic well-being of their clients or members. The AMA, for instance, long opposed Medicare and the development of health maintenance organizations (HMOs) as "socialized medicine" in favor of traditional fee-for-service.

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Abstract

In this Article, Einer Elhauge analyzes whether interest group theory justifies various proposals to change constitutional review, antitrust law, or statutory interpretation in order to make courts less deferential to the political process. He begins by demonstrating that interest group theory cannot identify instances where interest group influence is disproportionate without using implicit normative baselines that reflect substantive conclusions about the merits of political outcomes. Because such substantive conclusions are contestable, he concludes that interest group theory can provide no reliable grounds for collective condemnation of the political process. He then argues that, even if one stipulates a normative baseline, interest group theory does not demonstrate that the litigation process has a comparative advantage over the political process. Nor can one justify more intrusive judicial review on the ground that it increases the transaction costs of interest group capture. More intrusive judicial review can sometimes decrease such transaction costs, and increasing transaction costs can perversely encourage interest group activity, increase the relative advantage of interest groups, and retard legal changes that benefit the general public. In a final section, the Article offers parallel reasons for rejecting the claim that decision theory also justifies more intrusive judicial review.

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How do interest groups influence federal judges quizlet?

Interest groups in the American judicial system seek out litigants whose cases seem particularly strong or they also may support them with amicus curiae briefs which attempt to influence the Court's decision, raise additional point of view, and present information it contained in the briefs.

What ways do interest groups try to influence the government quizlet?

Terms in this set (4).
Lobbying. When a representative of an interest group tries to influence the government by communicating with those in government..
Litigation. Lawsuits..
Mobilizing public opinion. Institutional advertising, protests and demonstrations, and grassroot mobilizations..
Using electoral politics..

How do interest groups try to influence the courts quizlet?

Interest groups lobby the courts by filing amicus curiae briefs in cases that go before the U.S. Supreme Court. Interest groups try to influence who is nominated to the federal courts.

What do interest groups do effectively quizlet?

Interest groups are best able to represent geographic interests. Interest groups allow individuals to elect candidates to state office efficiently. Interest groups help to inform and organize the most interested citizens. Interest groups minimize competition in policy making.