The foreign policy described above represented a significant departure from which of the following

1Hardly had any other US presidential election spurred as much debate among pundits and critics, both inside and outside the United States, as Donald Trump’s election for President in November 2016. While at the beginning the debate has been focused on the reasons that made millions of Americans vote for this highly controversial, provocative, anti-establishment and atypical Republican candidate, [1] today the debate seems to have centered on the very nature of Trump’s presidency and the impact that his decisions and policies might have on America’s role in world affairs, and, more broadly, on the liberal international order as such. Despite the fact that foreign policy issues played a relatively small role in the election, numerous actions undertaken by President Trump soon after his entry in office, such as the ordering of US air-strikes in Syria in response to a chemical weapons attack in April 2017, his refusal to reaffirm America’s commitment to NATO Article 5, and his unilateral decision to withdraw the US from the Paris climate agreement, inevitably put his foreign policy at the center of all debates.

2Three main questions seem to underpin these debates. First, what is the Trump doctrine or Trump’s “grand strategy”, if any? Second, does Trump’s foreign policy strategy stem from any US historical tradition? Third, what are the risks of Trump’s foreign policy decision-making?

Is there a Trump’s “grand strategy”?

3According to Robert Art’s classical definition, “‘grand strategy’ deals with the full range of goals that a state should seek, but it concentrates primarily on how the military instrument should be employed to achieve them. It prescribes how a nation should wield its military instrument to realize its foreign policy goals.” [2] Posen and Ross underline that a well-defined and coherent “grand strategy” is one that identifies clearly: 1) the US interests and objectives; 2) the threats to those interests and objectives; 3) the appropriate strategic responses to those threats; and 4) the principles that should guide the development of US policy and strategy. [3] Accordingly, a “grand strategy” is often perceived as a roadmap that contains a vision for the US role in the world and thus sets up US most important foreign policy goals as well as the most effective instruments for achieving these goals. [4] Moreover, grand strategies and foreign policy doctrines are forward-looking, prescriptive and evolutionary, and are often formed in response to crises, which create very specific challenges or threats to American national interests. [5] That is the case of some clearly defined doctrines, such as the Bush doctrine (formed in response to 9/11 terrorist attacks), the Reagan doctrine (formed to allow the US to stand up to the Soviet Union expansion by supporting anti-Communist guerillas in all parts of the world) or the Truman doctrine (the famous strategy of containment). It is also important to note that a number of official documents, namely National Security Strategies, National Military Strategies, Quadrennial Defense Reviews and Defense Strategic Guidance, issued by the President, the Department of State or the Department of Defense, are at the disposal of each administration to lay down its grand strategy.

4Looking at the Trump administration which, even after its 100 first days in office, continues to function chaotically, some analysts, like Richard Haass, contend that not much of a “grand strategy” for establishing a new world order is to be found so far. [6] Surprisingly enough, this position is shared by some White House officials like Mike Dubke, Trump’s former communications director, who declared at a formal meeting that “There is no Trump doctrine” before being corrected by another Trump staffer that “America First is the Trump doctrine.” [7] Commentators argue that this highly improvisational and situational approach to foreign policy reflects the tensions inside the White House between the “globalists” and the “nationalists.” [8] The former are represented by Trump’s mainstream foreign policy advisers including his daughter Ivanka (hired as an unpaid government employee), his influential son-of-law Jared Kushner (senior advisor), Chief of staff Reince Priebus, National Security Council Director H. R. McMaster, Defense Secretary James Mattis, Secretary of State Rex Tillerson, while the latter include personalities like the far-right political strategist Steve Bannon.

5Indeed, one could hardly disagree that Trump’s foreign policy statements are full of erratic, confusing and controversial ideas. This, added to his foreign policy gaffes, and his impulsive and undiplomatic decision-making and communication style, makes it difficult to see a clear vision to guide Trump’s strategy in foreign policy. Nevertheless, if one applies Posen and Ross’ conceptual framework of “grand strategy” to Trump’s foreign policy, one will be astonished to find out that the majority of components–1) US vital interests and objectives; 2) threats for these interests; 3) strategic responses to threats; and 4) guidelines for US foreign policy –, for building a grand strategy are actually present. On 17 April 2016, then candidate Trump delivered a speech at an event hosted by The National Interest review, which could be considered as the cornerstone of his foreign policy. Indeed, the majority of his ideas first presented in a coherent way in this speech can be found in other discourses held by President-elect Trump, such as his Inaugural Address or his speech at the NATO Summit in Brussels in May 2017.

6In a lengthy, and surprisingly well-structured, speech published in The National Interest review, Trump has clearly defined both his vision of world politics and the main threats for US vital interests. He first draws a very bleak picture of today’s international order perceived as a very unbalanced and dangerous play-ground on which the US has been paying “the total financial, political and human costs of the security burden”, while its allies have been systematically “not paying their fair share.” [9] This resulted, in Trump’s view, in the US overextending its economic and military resources, thus allowing US adversaries to strengthen their power. Trump’s Hobbesian view of the international environment and his quasi-realist [10] understanding of world politics stand in stark contrast with the post-World War II internationalist consensus held by both mainstream liberals and conservatives. [11] According to this consensus, the US has persistently played a global hegemonic role in the sense of what G. John Ikenberry calls a “liberal Leviathan”, [12] in creating and maintaining the liberal international order. However, in Trump’s revisionist narrative, “the era of Pax Americana – the period in which the United States wielded the most power on the world stage – is defined above all by national loss and decline.” [13] Trump thus rejects the US liberal internationalist grand strategy seen as “a complete and total disaster”, and seeks to replace it with a “new, rational American foreign policy” aimed at “getting [the US] out of the nation-building business, and instead focusing on creating stability in the world.” [14]

7Although the US vital interests remain the same as they have been defined by every US President since the end of WWII: to ensure the country’s national security, economic well-being, and way of life, [15] Trump’s foreign policy strategy differs significantly from the liberal grand strategies “perceived to have done a poor job, leading to the increasing disorder in the Middle East and the global economic meltdown.” [16] To defend US security and economic interests, Trump embraces a neo-isolationist and neo-sovereigntist approach driven by his “America First” strategy, as first announced in his National Interest review speech: “‘America First’ will be the major and overriding theme of my administration.” [17]

8This strategy rejects, on the one hand, the idea of promoting “democratic peace” and nation-building abroad, all while considering military power as a core element of US foreign policy, as Trump has declared, “I will not hesitate to deploy military force when there is no alternative. But if America fights, it must fight to win.” [18] On the other hand, Trump’s “America First” strategy also rejects the two main pillars of the liberal grand strategy, namely multilateralism and globalism, and replaces them with “Americanism” understood as economic nationalism and protectionism – “Americanism, not globalism, will be our credo.” [19] By expressing bluntly his skepticism of “international unions that tie us up and bring America down […], and that reduces our ability to control our own affairs”, [20] Trump denounces “unfair trade deals” such as NAFTA seen as a “total disaster for the U.S.” In this regard, one of the first Executive orders (EO) he signed as President was to withdraw the US from the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) negotiations and “to begin pursuing, wherever possible, bilateral trade negotiations to promote American industry, protect American workers, and raise American wages.” [21] Trump’s economic nationalism goes hand-in-hand with protectionism grounded on “two simple rules”, as President Trump calls them in his Inaugural Address, “‘Buy American’ and ‘Hire American’.” [22] Furthermore, on the campaign trail Trump has also put into question the transatlantic relationship by calling NATO an “obsolete alliance” and accusing the European allies of free-riding, all while relying heavily on the US security umbrella for several decades. Soon after he stepped in office, President Trump took some extreme measures to strengthen US sovereignty and border control such as the signature of the EO “Protecting the Nation from Foreign Terrorist Entry into the United States”, [23] more commonly known as “the Muslim ban”. The latter bans all immigrants and visa holders from seven majority-Muslim countries (Libya, Iran, Iraq, Somalia, Sudan, Syria and Yemen) from entering the United States for 90 days, while all refugees are denied access to the country for 120 days, except Syrian refugees who are banned indefinitely.

9Although on the top of Trump’s list of threats for US vital interests stands “radical Islam” and containing its spread is seen by the Trump administration as “a major foreign policy goal of the United States”, [24] curiously enough, “unfair trade deals” and the trade practices of key competitors, in particular China, come next and are, therefore, seen as a national security priority. To face these challenges, Trump pledges, in the first place, to rebuild the US military in order to keep “our military dominance […] unquestioned.” [25] However, as previously stressed, Trump advocates a non-interventionist approach in foreign policy, which rests on the strategy of deterrence and the idea of having a strong military, but only in the purpose of guaranteeing homeland security. Some analysts define this aspect of Trump’s foreign policy a “muscular but aloof militarism” [26] according to which the US “would no longer emphasize a force posture or overseas presence associated with acting as a global constabulary and the primary provider of international security unless it received far higher rents for its efforts.” [27]

10In the second place, Trump’s strategy is also grounded on the idea according to which doing foreign policy is like running a business. In this light, applying deal-making to diplomacy and negotiations is considered crucial in order to obtain the best possible deal for America – “If we can’t make a good deal for America, then we will quickly walk from the table.” [28] Consequently, Trump’s foreign policy strategy stems from a “zero-sum” approach to global affairs seen as “a game of winners and losers, not an exchange that generates mutual gains.” [29] Additionally, this approach “entails an explicit rejection of America’s positive-sum, internationalist project, and a reversion to more narrowly nationalistic policies that carry distinct echoes of the 1930s and even before.” [30]

11Drawing on Posen and Ross’ conceptual framework of “grand strategy”, the above-made analysis reveals that President Trump actually has a grand strategy to the extent that he has defined all components: 1) a clear nationalist and sovereigntist vision of the US role in global affairs, which is narrowly focused on US interests and material gains, and no longer positions America as guarantor of the liberal world order; 2) the main threats the US has to face, namely Radical Islam and terrorism, “unfair trade deals” and entangling alliances, and illegal immigration; 3) the main instrument to defend US security and economy, i.e. military strength, when necessary, and “America First” pragmatic deal-making, even in diplomacy.

12Consequently, the real question to be asked is not: Is there a Trump’s grand strategy? Rather, it should be: Isn’t Trump’s “America First” grand strategy anti-American in the sense that it is at odds with the US post-WWII foreign policy tradition grounded on the US-led liberal internationalist project? As Thomas Wright underlines, “One of the most common misconceptions about Donald Trump is that he is opportunistic and makes up his views as he goes along. But a careful reading of some of Trump’s statements over three decades shows that he has a remarkably coherent and consistent worldview […]. Many of these views would have found favor in pre-World War II – and even, in some cases, 19th century-America.” [31] Accordingly, we argue that Trump’s “America First” grand strategy is deeply anchored in the US foreign policy history and can be best understood as a resurgence of the 19th-century foreign policy tradition, which the renowned historian Walter Russell Mead has described as the Jacksonian tradition.

13In his classical book “Special providence: American Foreign Policy and How It Changed the World”, first published in 2001, Mead distinguishes four principal schools of thought that have shaped the American foreign policy debate from the 18th century to the 21st century, and identifies them with four Founding fathers or US presidents – Alexander Hamilton, [32] Thomas Jefferson, [33] Andrew Jackson [34] and Woodrow Wilson. [35] According to Mead’s typology, Hamiltonians “regard a strong alliance between the national government and big business as the key both to domestic stability and to effective action abroad.” [36] Hence, the Hamiltonian school considers that US foreign policy should be driven by “commercial realism” and free-trade. Wilsonians believe that America’s mission of spreading democratic and social values throughout the world is a moral obligation and should therefore be at the core of US foreign policy. Opposing both the Hamiltonian and the Wilsonian policies of involving the US in costly economic or political alliances, Jeffersonians seek to replace commercial engagement and democracy promotion with nation-building at home. Their main purpose is thus to “reduce the costs and risks of foreign policy” and to advance US foreign policy interests “in the safest and most economical ways.” [37]

14Finally, Mead describes Jacksonians as “a large populist school” according to which both US domestic and foreign policy should be centered on “the physical security and the economic well-being of the American people.” [38] Jacksonians share some common points with the Jeffersonians, as stressed by Mead: [39] 1) they are both “profoundly suspicious of elites” and opt for the maximum extension of power retained by states and local governments; and 2) they are both “civil libertarians”, and embrace the protection of civil rights and liberties as a core principle of US domestic and foreign policy. In this sense, Jacksonians are “instinctively democratic and populist” [40] and consider that the government is a “necessary evil”, which can be tolerated as long as it protects the political, economic and moral well-being of the American people. Jacksonians are generally supportive of high military budgets because they believe that the government needs to have a strong military power to fulfil its mission. However, if the government fails and oppresses the majority in the service of an economic or cultural elite, Jacksonians turn against it and look to a popular hero to “fix” the corrupted government and bring it back to its main functions.

15However, unlike the other three schools, the Jacksonian school is not very well organized; neither does it have a clear political program. This explains why it is most often described as “less an intellectual or political movement than an expression of the social, cultural and religious values of a large portion of the American public.” [41] Moreover, it is difficult to identify the Jacksonians with one single political party: “[They] are neither liberal nor conservative in the ways that political elites use those terms; they are radically egalitarian, radically pro-middle class, radically patriotic, radically pro-Social Security.” [42]

16Additionally, since Jacksonians imagine the American nation as a “folk community bound together by deep cultural and ethnic ties”, [43] Jacksonianism is often perceived “as a variant of the US populist movement.” [44] Originally, Jacksonian populism stems from the back country regions of the Old West (Kentucky, Virginia, parts of Indiana and Illinois) and some Southern states (Alabama, Mississippi, Missouri, Tennessee and Texas), although today the “Jacksonian culture, values and self-identification have spread beyond their original ethnic limits.” [45]

17Roughly speaking, Jacksonian America represented originally the majority of the rural and nativist states of the Sun Belt composed mainly of white, Christian, European settlers. However, the processes of increased urbanization and immigration promoted by the Washington elite changed the face of Jacksonian America thus provoking the Jacksonian backlash. The latter took the form of an anti-establishment and anti-immigration ideology directed, on the one hand, against the East Coast urban and cosmopolitan elites, and their commercial policies seen as exploitative and harmful for Jacksonian folks. On the other hand, in order to protect itself from the new waves of immigrants, the “Jacksonian society draws an important distinction between those who belong to the folk community and those who do not […]. Outside that compact is chaos and darkness.” [46] Although Jacksonians are usually isolationists and are interested in domestic policy rather than in foreign policy, they could be considered, according to Mead, as classic realists insofar as they see the international life as anarchic and violent, and consider that rather than relying on the international law and international institutions, as Wilsonians tend to do, the United States has to be strongly armed to defend its national interests at any cost, including fighting pre-emptive wars and subverting foreign governments. [47]

18Having in mind the above-mentioned characteristics of Jacksonianism, the Trump phenomenon acquires its full meaning through Mead’s words: “Donald Trump, for now, is serving as a kind of blank screen on which Jacksonians project their hopes.” [48] There are at least three things, which Trump’s foreign policy has in common with the Jacksonian tradition.

19First, Trump fits ideally the role of the popular “hero” who has long been awaited by the Jacksonians to fix the corrupted government system. Although Trump is an inherited billionaire, he presented himself as an “anti-establishment candidate” pretending to be “the voice of the American people” and the right person to make things change for “Nobody knows the system better than me, which is why I alone can fix it.” [49] Moreover, in his Inaugural Address, he claimed that it was time to transfer power from Washington D.C. and give it back to the American people, the latter being defined by Trump as “the forgotten men and women of our country. People who work hard but no longer have a voice.” [50] Additionally, Trump has clearly embraced the vision of Jacksonian America seen as a distinct “community of folks” opposed to a “wide range of others” defined by Trump as “Muslims, Hispanics, women, Chinese, Mexicans, Europeans, Arabs, immigrants, refugees – whom he depicts either as threats or as objects of derision.” [51] Jacksonians are very skeptical about the cultural and economic benefits of immigration, which is seen as endangering the cohesion of the folk community and its economic well-being by creating low-wage competition for jobs. [52]

20As Fukuyama stresses, the paradox is that Trump’s main supporters are “rural working-class whites, particularly in Southern states with limited social services” who voted for the Republican candidate because of disapproving “the Democrats’ fixation with identity”, i.e. the Democrat-led “identity politics” based on cosmopolitanism, which has generated the feeling that “America has lost its identity.” [53] Under the populist banners “Make America Great Again” and “America First”, President Trump’s policies such as the construction of a “physical wall” along the US-Mexican border and his “Muslim ban”, embody the fear of foreigners, typical for populism and nativism, the latter combining anti-immigrant sentiment with a conspiracy vision about immigrants [54] seen an a threat for the “authentic” American identity and interests.

21Second, Trump’s Jacksonian vision of the American nation perceived as an extension of the folk community results in his protectionist and isolationist foreign policy, especially in the economic field, whereby his purpose is to reject “horrible and unfair trade deals” that “strip our country of its jobs and wealth” and destroy “our middle class.” [55] “Jacksonian America is actually open and liberal”, as Mead points out, but Jacksonians have to be convinced over and over again that a particular trade agreement operates to the benefit of American workers. [56] In this light, Trump pledges to “never sign any trade agreement that hurts our workers, or that diminishes our freedom or independence.” [57] Moreover, he has announced to replace multilateral agreements with bilateral ones so as to make “individual deals with individual countries”, as well as to renegotiate existing agreements like NAFTA “to get a much better deal for America.” [58]

22Third, Trump’s Hobbesian view of international relations is also in tune with the Jacksonian tradition. As mentioned previously, Trump’s “America First” grand strategy is grounded on two main ideas ‒ a quasi-realist understanding of world politics and the “return of self-help” [59] ‒, which are both cherished by Jacksonians. Another aspect of Jacksonian foreign policy that can be found in Trump’s grand strategy is the sense of national honor as a vital interest, which is closely related to warfighting. Although Jacksonians are non-interventionists, they regard warfighting as a necessary means of foreign policy, especially when the US security and economic interests are challenged. Moreover, as Mead stresses, “Jacksonian culture values firearms, and the freedom to own and use them.” [60] By rejecting the idea of a “limited military intervention”, Jacksonians see “war as a switch that is either ‘on’ or ‘off’” and consider that “wars must be fought with all available force.” [61] In this light, Trump’s criticisms addressed to Obama’s “limited war” in Libya and his “red line fiasco” in Syria, make full sense in terms of losing face and staining America’s international image and reputation. From the point of view of the Jacksonian code of honor and warfighting, Trump’s decision to launch missile air strikes in Syria in response to the use of chemical weapons against the civilians supposedly by the Assad regime, is not surprising and reveals his Jacksonian determination to adopt a more muscular foreign policy approach regarding countries whose regimes represent a threat for US vital interests. In the same vein, Trump’s criticism addressed to NATO goes beyond the traditional burden sharing debate and calls for the return of the Jacksonian foreign policy strategy of enhancing American security and sovereignty. As Hal Brands puts it, “Shedding alliance commitments would reduce America’s global military burdens; shedding the constraints imposed by international institutions and multilateralism would provide greater ability to act unilaterally and decisively.” [62]

The risks [63] of Trump’s Jacksonian foreign policy decision-making

23However, there are at least two problems raised by Trump’s “America First” grand strategy and today’s resurgence of the Jacksonian tradition in US foreign policy.

24The first one stems from the fact that Trump’s foreign policy strategy represents, as Fareed Zakaria argues, “the most radical departure from a bipartisan American foreign policy since 1945” [64] and, as such, constitutes “a challenge to the liberal order […] because it comes with a causal disrespect for the norms and values of liberal democracy itself.” [65] Some analysts question further the consequences of Trump’s grand strategy by asking whether it will cause “the collapse of the liberal world order” [66] and “the end of the West as we know it.” [67]

25The second problem is related to Trump’s neo-isolationist and zero-sum approach to global affairs, which signals the disengagement of America in its traditional role of global security provider, from the international scene. The risk of the US abandoning its global political and economic leadership is one of rising insecurity and power vacuum, which will undoubtedly encourage regional powers like China, Russia or Iran, to try to take the lead. The return of Jacksonian code built on nativism, realism and economic nationalism in world politics could also trigger what Stewart Patrick calls “hedging” against US unreliability and retrenchment from global affairs. Hedging is “most common when great powers are unpredictable and the global distribution of power is shifting fast.” [68] In Stewart Patrick’s view, security hedging, especially in the Middle East, would diminish US influence in the region and give a way to other countries, like Iran and Russia, of expanding their presence there. Economic hedging could also have a very negative impact on US interests. If the US abdicates its global economic leadership, other major economies, particularly China, could take the lead of global economy.

26The outcome of Trump’s America First grand strategy would thus be full of paradoxes, as S. Patrick argues, because instead of reducing America’s vulnerability to international threats and unfair economic competition, this strategy would rather expose Americans to global instability and economic retaliation, and accelerate the demise of the world the United States made. [69] In addition, the resurgence of Jacksonianism in US foreign policy does not only constitute the latest phase of the long historical conflict between two Americas – the one that is represented by the Wilsonian and the Hamiltonian traditions grounded on liberal internationalism, and the other one embodied by the Jeffersonian and the Jacksonian traditions of populism and protectionism. The rise of Jacksonian America actually “reflects a breakdown in the social contract at the core of liberal democracy” [70] based on the promise that those disadvantaged by market forces do not fall too far behind. However, elites have taken advantage of the global liberal order without keeping that promise. Put in Mead’s words, the “international order needs to rest not just on elite consensus and balances of power and policy but also on the free choices of national communities – communities that need to feel protected from the outside world as much as they want to benefit from engaging with it.” [71]

27Indeed, the Trump phenomenon has let the genie out of the bottle and the resurgence of Jacksonianism in US foreign policy now seems unstoppable. Only time will tell if the return of Jacksonian America will end up with the worst case scenario, i.e. the unraveling of US-led liberal international order and the rise of new revisionist great powers. A less dramatic scenario could be built on “a more benign and constructive nationalism – essentially, internationalism with a nationalist ascent.” [72] According to this scenario, the goal of US nationalist foreign policy would not be to abandon the liberal internationalist project, but to improve it by using US leverage to reform international institutions, all while taking seriously identity politics in both foreign and domestic policy.