Which of the following is important and beneficial resource that lobbyists provide government officials Group of answer choices?
What is the most important and beneficial resource that lobbyists provide government officials? mobilizing public opinion.
What makes lobbying different from other strategies of influence quizlet?
Lobbying is the least expensive and most democratic strategy of influencing government. Lobbyists try to exert pressure directly on government officials themselves. e. Lobbyists try to exert pressure directly on government officials themselves.
Who do lobbyists represent in their?
Lobbyists represent interest groups in their attempts to influence the government.
Who do lobbyists represent their attempts to influence government?
In politics, lobbying, persuasion, or interest representation is the act of lawfully attempting to influence the actions, policies, or decisions of government officials, most often legislators or members of regulatory agencies.
What distinguishes lobbying from other strategies?
What distinguishes lobbying from other strategies of influence? a. Lobbying is the least expensive and the most democratic strategy of influencing government.
What is the purpose of bribery in lobbying?
Bribery is just one of the supposed ways in which the lobbying system is perceived to perpetrate wrongdoing. The purpose of lobbyists is simplistically to meet with legislators and explain the nature and goals of the organizations they represent in the hopes of convincing those legislators to become somewhat friendly to the lobbyist’s cause.
When does bribery take place in a political party?
When a legislator asks for a specific monetary amount in exchange for the legislator’s vote, bribery is taking place. But when the legislator’s political party is instead given a donation from a lobbyist, it need not influence the legislator in any particular fashion.
Do you have the right to withhold money from lobbying?
Every company and person has a right to donate money to those parties most likely to serve their goals, and they then have the right to withhold that money should those parties not actually serve their goals. That is the ideal nature of lobbying, and as long as it remains in that vein, then lobbying need not be eliminated.
Read Online (Free) relies on page scans, which are not currently available to screen readers. To access this article, please contact JSTOR User Support . We'll provide a PDF copy for your screen reader.
With a personal account, you can read up to 100 articles each month for free.
Get StartedAlready have an account? Log in
Monthly Plan
- Access everything in the JPASS collection
- Read the full-text of every article
- Download up to 10 article PDFs to save and keep
Yearly Plan
- Access everything in the JPASS collection
- Read the full-text of every article
- Download up to 120 article PDFs to save and keep
Log in through your institution
Purchase a PDF
Purchase this article for $34.00 USD.
How does it work?
- Select the purchase option.
- Check out using a credit card or bank account with PayPal.
- Read your article online and download the PDF from your email or your account.
journal article
Ties that count: explaining interest group access to policymakersJournal of Public Policy
Vol. 34, No. 1 (April 2014)
, pp. 93-121 (29 pages)
Published By: Cambridge University Press
//www.jstor.org/stable/43864455
Read and download
Log in through your school or library
Alternate access options
For independent researchers
Read Online
Read 100 articles/month free
Subscribe to JPASS
Unlimited reading + 10 downloads
Purchase article
$34.00 - Download now and later
Abstract
The degree to which interest groups gain access to policymakers has often been explained by focusing on the exchange of resources in a dyadic relation between interest groups and policymakers. This article argues that the position an interest group occupies within a coalition and the relations it has outside its coalition substantially affect the likelihood of gaining access to policymakers. Our empirical focus is on the Dutch interest group system for which we examine how coalitions among groups and the network position of interest groups within and between such coalitions shape access. The analysis, based on data collected among 107 Dutch interest groups and 28 policymakers, leads to the conclusion that network positions count differently for elected and non-elected officials, and that network ties that bridge different coalitions add significant explanatory leverage to resource-based explanations of access.
Journal Information
The Journal of Public Policy applies social science theories and concepts to significant political, economic and social issues and to the ways in which public policies are made. Its articles deal with topics of concern to public policy scholars in America, Europe, Japan and other advanced industrial nations. The journal often publishes articles that cut across disciplines, such as environmental issues, international political economy, regulatory policy and European Union processes.
Publisher Information
Cambridge University Press (www.cambridge.org) is the publishing division of the University of Cambridge, one of the world’s leading research institutions and winner of 81 Nobel Prizes. Cambridge University Press is committed by its charter to disseminate knowledge as widely as possible across the globe. It publishes over 2,500 books a year for distribution in more than 200 countries. Cambridge Journals publishes over 250 peer-reviewed academic journals across a wide range of subject areas, in print and online. Many of these journals are the leading academic publications in their fields and together they form one of the most valuable and comprehensive bodies of research available today. For more information, visit //journals.cambridge.org.
Rights & Usage
This item is part of a JSTOR Collection.
For terms and use, please refer to our Terms and Conditions
Journal of Public Policy © 2014 Cambridge University Press
Request Permissions